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Damages in Housing Discrimination Cases
James A. Ciocia*
T HE EXISTENCE OF A SHORTAGE of adequate housing in the United States
has further intensified the problems of those who suffer most when
there is a shortage of anything-the minority groups. They have been
the victims of the most malicious forms of discrimination, compelling
them to remain confined to segregated areas in large urban complexes,
stifling their spirit, and condemning them to what, in many cases, is a
fight to stay alive. The public has become increasingly aware of the
problem as more people from all walks of life are affected by the de-
plorable housing situation. Contributing to the awareness of the public
is the salient fact that within the last ten years there has been a con-
sistent increase in the number of court cases dealing with housing dis-
crimination. The scope of these cases has expanded from what had been
a broad interpretation of public accommodation statutes to the award
of damages, both compensatory and punitive, for private acts of discrimi-
nation which allegedly precipitated mental suffering on the part of the
complainant. A more efficient means of handling such cases is on the
horizon with the advent of the use of an administrative agency adjudi-
cating the disputes and awarding damages.
Early Case Development
The award of damages in cases involving racial discrimination is by
no means a recent development in civil rights law. A Louisiana case de-
cided in 1876 awarded to a Negro damages of $300 because he was de-
nied admittance to a theater, a place of public accommodation, after he
had purchased a ticket.' The determination was made according to a
state law2 which only a year later was held by the Supreme Court to be
unconstitutional.3
For many years certain states4 have considered discrimination by
private persons for reasons of race, color, or religion to be contrary to
public policy.5 After the Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights
* B.A., Univ. of Dayton; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University; Legal Intern with the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland.
1 Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876).
2 Act. 38 of 1869 § 1070, La. Rev. Stat.
3 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1877). The Louisiana Act of Feb. 23,
1869 was held to encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce.
4 Notably California. See, Cal. Civ. C. §§ 51-54, which became effective in 1905.
5 Bamberger and Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforce-
ment of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 Harv. L. R. 526 (1961). [Hereinafter cited
as Bamberger and Lewin.]
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Act of 1875,6 which had prohibited discrimination in public accommo-
dations, many states enacted statutes dealing with that same form of dis-
crimination. 7 These statutes established either criminal penalties against
those who discriminated, a right to damages for those who were dis-
criminated against, or both! s
One need not be more than a casual observer of American history
to realize that the aforementioned actions by some states were in no way
indicative of a steadily progressive trend toward rectification of racial
injustices. On the contrary, as recently as 1964 the Supreme Court dealt
with basically the same problem that was before the Louisiana court in
1876. 9
One of the more significant early housing cases involving discrimi-
nation in the leasing of apartments was New York State Commission
Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments."° Although limited
to the enforcement of a cease-and-desist order, the court recognized and
reaffirmed the proposition that property rights are not absolute and that
the public welfare is to be the primary concern." The court stated that
there is a presumption of the constitutionality of legislative acts dealing
with the eradication of racial or religious discrimination. 12 These laws
will be overturned only when they appear to be "clearly arbitrary, dis-
criminatory and without reasonable basis." 13 The limitation of an own-
er's property rights or the loss of income without provision for compen-
sation in some isolated incidents does not afford sufficient basis for de-
claring such legislation unconstitutional.1 4 Only where the act purports
6 Ibid. "The Civil Rights Cases," 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883). The Supreme Court
strictly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to limit only state action and de-
clared that the Thirteenth Amendment concerned itself only with slavery or its inci-
dents, discrimination in public accommodations not being one of them.
7 Bamberger and Lewin; op. cit. supra n. 5.
8 Ill. Laws 1885, at 64, §§ 1, 2; Ind. Acts 1885, c. 47, §§ 1, 2 at 76.
9 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964).
Refusal to rent motel rooms to Negroes was declared an obstruction of interstate
commerce. Ironically, the same theory was used in 1877 to uphold discrimination.
1o 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1958). And see, below, at n. 72.
11 Although not cited in this case, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 54 S. Ct.
505, 510 (1934) stated basically the same principle: "Under our form of government
the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for gov-
ernment cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm." See, Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 125 (1876); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 566, 19
S. Ct. 281, 284 (1899); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351,
24 S. Ct. 436, 462 (1904).
12 New York State Commission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments,
supra n. 10, at 347, 170 N.Y.S. 2d at 758.
1' Id.
14 Id.
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to confiscate the owner's property and deny him the use for which it was
reasonably adapted will the legislation be overturned. 15
A 1960 New Jersey decision is notable for having upheld that state's
Law Against Discrimination. The court in Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division
Against Discrimination6 interpreted the statute's reference to publicly
assisted housing accommodations to include housing projects whose mort-
gages were insured by the federal government. The court reasoned that
housing developments owe their very existence to the Federal Housing
Administration in that it has enabled home buying and construction to
exist on such a large scale.1 7 It reiterated the holding in the Pelham
Apartments17a case that the right to own property be subject to the legis-
lature's police power. Due to the lack of sufficient housing, public policy
requires the existence of such a statute to protect the rights of those in
minority groups.'8 The present New Jersey law states:
The Division on Civil Rights in the Department of Law and
Public Safety shall enforce the laws of this state against discrimi-
nation in housing built with public funds or public assistance, pur-
suant to any law, and in real property, as defined in the law hereby
supplemented, because of race, religious principles, color, national
origin or ancestry. The said laws shall be enforced in the manner
prescribed in the act to which this act is a supplement.19
The court also upheld the power of the Division Against Discrimination
(now the Division on Civil Rights) to hear and decide charges brought
by complainants. 20
In Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., a California case decided in
1962, the complainant brought an action against a contractor and one of
his employees seeking damages and injunctive relief for discrimination
in the sale of a house which was part of a tract.2 1 The court took a po-
sition similar to that taken in Levitt2la in holding that the government
could not lend its support to private housing when such aid also serves
to enhance and perpetuate discrimination. The court reasoned that such
action is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and the state may there-
fore extend the prohibition against discrimination to cover private hous-
15 Id. The statute deals with discrimination in such areas as employment, the hold-
ing of office, public accommodations, jury selection, burial of the dead, and housing.
It provides for an administrative agency to handle complaints.
16 31 N.J. 514, 158 A. 2d 177 (1960); appeal dism. 363 U.S. 418, 80 S. Ct. 1257 (1960);
citing N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 to 10:28.
17 Id. at 528, 158 A. 2d at 184.
17a Supra n. 10.
'8 Supra n. 16 at 533, 158 A. 2d at 187. See generally, Dodyk, Severn, Berger, Young
and Paulsen, Cases and Materials on Law and Poverty 726 (1969).
19 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-9.1; formerly § 18:25-9.1.
20 Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, supra n. 16 at 536, 158 A.
2d at 188.
21 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P. 2d 313 (1962).
21a Supra n. 16.
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ing.22 It determined that the defendant construction company was a
"business establishment" within the meaning of the statute23 and was
thus prohibited from engaging in discriminatory practices. In discussing
the importance of adequate housing the court stated:
Moreover, the primary purpose of the governmental assistance,
namely, to raise the housing standards of the community, will be
frustrated to a substantial extent if racial minorities, whose housing
conditions are often substandard, are hampered in obtaining the full
benefits of the assistance.
24
Jones v. Mayer
The Thirteenth Amendment 25 had never been used to enforce the
right to possess property prior to Jones v. Mayer.26 This landmark de-
cision prohibited all racial discrimination, public or private, in the sale
or rental of property. The complainants initiated the action because of
the defendants' refusal to sell them a home in a private subdivision be-
cause of their race. They sought an injunction, compensatory damages
of $50, and punitive damages of $10,000 in the District Court.27 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court, in reversing for the petitioners in effect re-
versed "The Civil Rights Cases" of 1883,28 holding that Congress was
given the power to remove all "badges and incidents of slavery" 29 by
the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Civil Rights Act of
1866.3 0 The Supreme Court, however, decided that the complainants
were not entitled to monetary damages, punitive or compensatory. In
place of compensatory damages, the complainants received injunctive
relief entitling them to purchase a home from the respondents at a price
prevalent at the time the discriminatory action occurred (1965). This
was substantially less than the current market price and would leave
petitioners with no uncompensated injury. Under no circumstances, how-
ever, would they be entitled to punitive damages. The Court did not rule
out the possibility that compensatory damages may at some future time
be awarded for violation of that Act, nor did it give an opinion as to
what damages might be awarded under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.3
1
22 Supra n. 21 at 616, 370 P. 2d at 320.
23 Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 35700-35741.
24 Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., supra n. 21 at 616, 370 P. 2d at 320.
25 Section I reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
26 392 U.S. 409, 88 S. Ct. 2186 (1968).
27 379 F. 2d 33, 36 (8th Cir. 1967).
28 "The Civil Rights Cases," supra n. 6.
29 Jones v. Mayer, supra n. 26 at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 2240.
30 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982.
31 Jones v. Mayer, supra n. 27 at 414-415 and n. 13, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2190 and n. 14.
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Jones v. Mayer 1 " will undoubtedly do a great deal to expedite all
future cases in an area where, in many instances, time is of the essence,
and where in the past time has worked to discourage and frustrate many
an injured party with a valid cause of action.
Racial Discrimination as a Tort
Even prior to Jones v. Mayer,31b it was suggested that discrimination
be made an actionable tort by legislative enactment making those inflict-
ing intentional harm responsible for their actions.32 This approach had
been suggested as a satisfactory alternative to the issuance of a cease-
and-desist order by an administrative body which often comes too late
and offers an inadequate remedy. 33
The fact that Congress and various state legislatures have enacted
anti-discrimination legislation is indicative of a general awareness that
racial discrimination is a wrong requiring both a prohibition and a
remedy. 34
By making discrimination unlawful, legislative enactments serve to
create a standard of conduct. The extension of existing tort doc-
trines based upon the legislation make a violation of the statute
a prima facie tort. The court does not look to the statute for rem-
edies; rather it looks to it to determine whether the prescribed
standard of conduct has been met. Thus, the court does not usurp
the function of the legislature by the act of interpretation.35
By awarding damages the court could, in effect, act to carry out the
intent of the legislature and achieve a complete remedy where an
administrative agency's relief had been limited to a cease-and-desist
order.38
Victims of housing discrimination may be awarded damages by the
court for the "difference in purchase price of real estate due to a refusal
to sell originally desired property. ... ,, 37 Complainants could also be
awarded damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering.38 Such
an award might also be termed an expression of legislative intent to
eliminate discrimination because of the great amount of anxiety and
31a Supra n. 26.
31b Id.
32 Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discrimination Cases, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. R.
1 (1966); Magaro, Extra-Legislative Tort Liability for Discrimination, 18 W.R. L. R.
278 (1966).
33 Duda, op. cit. supra n. 32.
34 Magaro, op. cit. supra n. 33 at 285.
35 Id. at 289.
36 Duda, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 6.
37 Id.
38 Magaro, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 285. See, Oleck, Cases on Damages 7, 9, 166-8, 302
(1962); Oleck, Damages to Persons & Property §§ 175, 177 et seq. (1961 rev. ed.).
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frustration that discrimination engenders within those who are its vic-
tims. Not only do they lose their self-respect, but also the determination
to continue the struggle for equal rights.
The Increased Role of the Administrative Agency
The use of the courts to aid victims of discrimination has well-
recognized limitations. Two writers, in an article dealing with anti-
discrimination legislation, stated that: 3'
Individuals are often hesitant to make use of civil action statutes
because of the expense, effort, and threat of community opprobrium
their use may entail, the difficulty of calculating damages and their
inadequacy as a remedy for one whose primary interest is in finding
a better home or job indicate that broad reliance upon civil remedies
would be misplaced.
Sole reliance upon civil remedies would work a special hardship on
victims of housing discrimination. The immediate relief required for
their predicament would not be forthcoming. They would be forced to
seek other housing until their cause was heard resulting in great incon-
venience and expense. They would also be required to pay legal fees
which, along with the expenses connected with obtaining temporary
housing, would far exceed the financial means of most of those who are
victims of discriminatory conduct. The existence of these obstacles may
explain why there have been relatively few cases in this area.
A remedy for the situation is the expanded use of an administrative
agency which would not only issue cease-and-desist orders but could also
award damages subject, of course, to judicial review. The power of the
National Labor Relations Board is analogous in that it can issue injunc-
tions and award back pay in discrimination cases.40 This authority has
been challenged repeatedly throughout the years but continues to be one
of the most effective weapons in the hands of the N.L.R.B. The reason
the N.L.R.B. has been allowed to retain this power is that the defendant
always has access to the courts for purposes of appeal. It was held in
Crowell v. Benson4 1 that as long as the right to appeal to a judicial body
existed, there was no interference with the judicial power and that the
requirement of due process of law was satisfied. Furthermore, the doc-
trine of separation of powers was not violated by granting an agency this
power.
The question has been raised on many occasions as to whether giving
an administrative agency the power to award damages is in violation of
39 Bamberger and Lewin, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 526.
40 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1935).
41 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932), upheld the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act which provided for the use of an administrative agency to deter-
mine questions of fact in cases of compensation for injuries occurring on navigable
waters.
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the Seventh Amendment's guarantee to a jury trial when the value of
the controversy exceeds $20. However, in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,42 it was held that this guarantee applies only to a suit in
common law, and that the back-pay award involved in that case was
statutory in nature and therefore not within the purview of the Seventh
Amendment. 4 3 Moreover, the back-pay award is remedial and not puni-
tive in nature. Its intent is to make the injured party whole and not to
penalize the wrongdoer. 44
Administrative agencies have, of late, been awarding damages in
discrimination cases. The most recent instance of this where housing
discrimination was involved was Jackson v. Concord,45 a New Jersey
case decided in June of 1969. The complainant, a Negro, had been denied
the opportunity to lease an apartment in a complex owned and operated
by respondents. He filed a complaint with the Division on Civil Rights
of the Department of Law and Safety. The Division subsequently found
that the complainant had been denied an "equal opportunity to lease an
apartment," 46 that such property was within the coverage of the Law
Against Discrimination,47 and that such denial constituted a violation of
said act.4 8 Remedial orders were entered by the director which included
a provision that complainant was entitled to recover compensatory dam-
ages from respondents equal to the increased rental and travel expenses
resulting from his having to live elsewhere. The order directed the exact
amount of these damages to be determined after complainant commenced
the tenancy the respondents were required by the order to furnish him.49
On appeal the Director's orders were affirmed except for the pro-
vision giving the complainant a right to damages. The court held that
the Director had no authority under the statute to award damages.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey broadly interpreted the Law
Against Discrimination to include the power of the Division to award
compensatory damages. The applicable section of the statute reads:
If, upon all evidence at the hearing the director shall find that
the respondent has engaged in any unlawful employment practice
or unlawful discrimination as defined in this act, the director shall
state his findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall issue and
42 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
43 U.S. Const. Amend. VII; "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."
44 Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7, 10, 61 S. Ct. 77, 79 (1940).
45 54 N.J. 113, 253, A. 2d 793 (1969).
46 Id. at 116, 253 A. 2d at 794.
47 Id., the court referring to N.J.SA.. § 10:5-1 to 28.
48 Id., the court referring to N.J.S.A. § 10: 5-12g.
49 Id.
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cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such re-
spondent to cease and desist from such unlawful employment prac-
tice or unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action,
including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of
employees, with or without back pay, or restoration to membership,
in any respondent labor organization, or extending full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges to all persons,
as, in the judgment of the director, will effectuate the purpose of this
act, and including a requirement for report of the manner of com-
pliance. (Emphasis added.) 50
The court stated that as a matter of public policy the state must protect
the civil rights of its inhabitants not only for their benefit but also to
preserve the free state. One of the rights deserving of protection was
the right to the benefits of real property.51 Relying on David v. Vesta
Co.,5 2 the court said:
. . . prevention of unlawful discrimination vindicates not only the
rights of individuals but also the vital interests of the State. In
short, such discrimination is regarded as a public wrong and not
merely the basis of a private grievance. 53
The court further stated that based on David v. Vesta, there was no
constitutional objection to the award of money damages by an adminis-
trative agency because the respondent still had the right to seek judicial
review of the matter.5 4 The court reasoned that the provision in the
statute for the award of "back pay" in employment discrimination cases
indicated that the legislature did not intend that the Division be without
the power to make damage awards.55
Another provision of the statute which makes the final determination
of the Division the exclusive remedy5 6 forced the court to conclude that
once a complainant pursued his grievance to completion in the Division,
he would be precluded from seeking relief otherwise for his out-of-
pocket losses.5 7 It may be assumed that the Division, therefore, had the
power to order remedial relief since it could not be implied that the
legislature intended an injured party to lose his right to obtain recom-
pense by coming before the Division.
The order for damages was affirmed. The court stated that the com-
plainant's financial position made it extremely difficult to meet the in-
creased housing costs while the litigation was taking place. A complain-
50 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-17.
51 Id.
52 45 N.J. 301, 212 A. 2d 345 (1965).
53 Jackson v. Concord, supra n. 45.
54 Id. at 126, 253 A. 2d at 800.
55 Id. at 127, 253 A. 2d at 800.
56 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12.
57 Jackson v. Concord, supra n. 45.
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ant would be discouraged from pursuing the matter if he knew that his
victory would be an empty one.5 He must have some insurance that his
rights will be enforced and that he will come away from the fight as
financially whole as he would have been had no discrimination taken
place. Hence, the complainant was awarded damages totaling $806 to
cover traveling expenses and the expense of renting another dwelling.59
New York expressly grants its agency dealing with civil rights the
power to issue a cease-and-desist order, the power to award damages to
the complainant, and the power to take other affirmative action to en-
force civil rights.60 In the recent decision of Commission on Human
Rights of the City of New York v. Knox Realty"' the court interpreted
the statute as investing within the commission broad powers to carry out
the policies promulgated by the statute. It further expressed the idea
that the court should only interfere where "the remedy has no reason-
able relation to the unlawful practices felt to exist." 62 The court went
on to say that mental anguish and suffering are "proper elements of
damage to be taken into consideration where persons aggrieved have
been deprived of their undoubted basic civil rights." 63 This is a rela-
tively new concept and is applicable to all civil rights cases although it
is here only applied to a situation involving discrimination in an apart-
ment rental. The case resulted in an award of $100 damages to the
plaintiff.6
4
58 Ibid.
59 Id.
60 N. Y. Executive L. § 297-4(c) (1968), which reads: "... If, upon all the evidence
at the hearing, the commissioner shall find that a respondent has engaged in any un-
lawful discriminatory practice as defined in the article, the commissioner shall state
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order,
based on such findings and setting them forth, (i) requiring such respondent to cease
and desist from such unlawful discriminatory practice; (ii) requiring such respond-
ent to take such affirmative action including (but not limited to) . . .the extension
of full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges
to all persons; (iii) awarding of compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by
such practice, as, in the judgment of the division, will effectuate the purposes of this
article; and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance ......
61 56 Misc. 2d 806, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
62 Id. at 808, 290 N.Y.S. 2d at 636. See, Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 66 S. Ct.
758 (1946).
63 Id. See, Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (9th Cir. 1962); Solomon v. Penn.
R. R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 709 (3rd Cir. 1951).
64 It might be here noted that California also has a statute expressly giving its State
Fair Employment Practice Commission the power to award damages, to wit, the
California Health and Safety Code § 35738, which reads: "If the commission finds
that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice as defined in this part, the
commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on
such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such
practice and to take one of the following affirmative actions, as in the judgment of
the commission, will effectuate the purpose of this part:
(1) The sale or rental of the housing accommodation to the aggrieved per-
son, if it is still possible.
(Continued on next page)
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As more litigation arises, administrative agencies should become
more frequently used as a means of effecting remedies in discriminatory
situations. Two authors have stated that: 
65
Although most other personal rights are enforceable only by an
aggrieved individual's initiation of a court action in which he must
bear the cost and inconvenience of the proceedings, the importance
of equal treatment to the general welfare gives the state a special
interest in vindicating the rights of complainants. Since the enforce-
ment of an individual's right will have a broad educative effect on
the community, the state has also an interest of its own as strong
as the complainant's. By replacing the ineffective civil or criminal
suit with administrative investigation and enforcement, it is able to
insure that both objectives are realized.
Conclusion
An administrative agency, at least on paper, is capable of achieving
a more efficient rectification of discriminatory behavior than are the
courts. Allowing the agency to handle both the action for discrimination
and for damages would save the parties considerable time and expense. 66
This is particularly important when the problem involves housing be-
cause the critical shortage of adequate housing tends to multiply the
inconveniences, expenses, and general anxiety which an individual must
endure in seeking a home. Given an efficiently organized agency, the
process of relocation of families would be greatly expedited.
Members of an administrative agency are generally experts in their
field and are generally more familiar with the problems connected with
discrimination than are most judges and juries.67 Most judges and juries,
not being representatives of minority groups, have a difficult time com-
prehending the effect that a discriminatory act has on an injured party.6 s
This understanding is especially important where mental suffering is
involved because those who are not members of a minority group are
generally unable to appreciate the devastating psychological effect that
an act of discrimination has on a victim.
The fact that a remedy could be achieved before an administrative
body more efficiently and at less expense should serve as an impetus to
those who would normally not come forward with otherwise legitimate
(Continued from preceding page)
(2) The sale or rental of a like accommodation, if one is available, or the
next vacancy in a like accommodation.
(3) The payment of damages to the aggrieved person in an amount not to
exceed five hundred dollars ($500), if the commission determines that neither
of the remedies under (1) or (2) is available."
65 Bamberger and Lewin, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 528.
66 Magaro, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 286.
67 Id.
68 Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations of Civil Rights, 17
Hastings L. J. 189 at 203-204 (1965-66).
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complaints. Knowing this, would-be violators would not feel as free to
abuse the rights of others as they have in the past.
Moreover, the rights of minority groups would be protected. Not
only would they be compensated for their injury, "but the accused prop-
erty owner would escape the publicity that is attendant upon court pro-
ceedings even prior to findings of fact." 69 Jones v. Mayer,70 Jackson v.
Concord,71 and other similar cases have demonstrated that the right to
adequate housing is basic and must not be encumbered. In 1969 the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that damages should be awarded for refusal
to rent an apartment (a case of racial discrimination), and that this is
a tort injury.72 The award of damages, compensatory or punitive, for
denial of equal housing opportunities by bigots, seems an extremely
effective means of removing the impediments to the basic right to fair
treatment in housing.
69 Kaplan, Discrimination in California Housing: The Need for Additional Legisla-
tion, 50 Calif. L. R. 635, 647 at n. 57 (1959).
70 Supra n. 26.
71 Supra n. 45.
72 Jackson v. The Concord Co. (N.J. Super. Ct., June 2, 1969) reported in N.Y. Times,
p. 24 (June 3, 1969). And see, supra at n. 10.
Jan. 1970
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
